

SADC Multilateral Approach for Sustainable Development in Cabo Delgado

By Mmakoenia Mpshane-Nkosi¹

ABSTRACT:


This article investigates the political stability of Cabo Delgado's insurgency in Mozambique and the regional multilateral efforts of the South African Development Community (SADC) and international organisations. Since establishing the United Nations' seventeen Sustainable Development Goals five years ago, recent studies have shown that governance sustainability is essential for peace and security. According to Meadowcroft (2007), sustainable governance refers to the socio-political governance systems established to achieve sustainable growth. Thus, sustainable governance is a foundation for ensuring the achievement of long-term governmental goals managed and operated by multiple actors within a system. Sustainable development promotes methodical and constructive planning of current and future usage of resources. Governance refers to how government manage and exercises the country's economic and social resources for growth. While many scholars in the last two years, such as Bosman and Gruzd (2022), Sithole (2022), and Okunade et al. (2021), have indicated the conflict vulnerability to the Southern African region, the government and bloc's slow response, particularly in dealing with the armed conflict; this study argues that the multilaterally the region responded on time and is ensuring sustainable development and peace and security. The article details the multilateral approach used for counterterrorism, mainly the use of military intervention and continuous discourse within political spaces. The qualitative method extrapolates how stability, safety and security were achieved and the sustainable development plans.

Keywords: Insurgency, Cabo Delgado, SADC, Mozambique, Multilateralism, Good Governance Theory

1. Introduction

The Southern African region has relative peace and security compared to other African regions. In contrast, the area was unprepared for the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, a province in Mozambique on the Indian Ocean's coastline. However, the regional dialogue took place after constructive multilateral engagements. Even though some scholars, such as Sithole (2022), assert that the regional bloc took time to respond, it is the nature of democracy to apply political procedures to mitigate any conflict (Sisk, 2003). Democracy as a political system allows inclusive decision-making based on principles, institutions, rules associated with democratic practice and processes to manage political conflict. While also seeking the best collective solutions without the risk of loss of life and political battle.

¹PhD Candidate, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Her research is focused on the new forms of diplomacy in the twenty-first century, peace, and security for sustainable development.



2. Theoretical Background

2.1 What is insurgency?

During and after the Cold War, armed conflicts were perceived as interbellum between independent states (Laqueur, 2004). In the twenty-first century, insurgencies are more common forms of armed conflicts and are considered significant peace, security, and sustainable development threats in international politics (Kilcullen, 2006, pp. 111–130). Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have changed to the emergence of non-state actors against nation-states (Okunade et al., 2021, p. 435). According to Sithole (2022), the fundamental causes of state-based conflicts emerge from either ethno-religious cleavage, failed political transitions and political contestation, particularly in post-electoral processes, polarisation and unfairness and injustice stemming from issues of marginalisation which can result in violent civil conflict. In Africa, the proliferation of Islamic or Jihadist extremism is incited by factors ranging from economic crises, poverty, and the state's fragility (Mroszczyk & Abrahms, 2021, p. 3). In contrast with other continents, the conflict in African states has often been a result of the discoveries of natural resources (Sithole, 2022). Other contributing factors include underdeveloped or weak institutions, corruption, weak civil participation, and low political transparency (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Hellesen (2008) states that the United States Department of Defence conceptualised insurgency as organised groups with the sole intention of overthrowing a legitimate government through revolutionary means and armed conflicts. The primary goal of these movements was/is to get control of the government and resources, or where they

partially failed, share power with a legitimate government (Siegel, 2015). In other words, these movements use unlawful means and tactics necessary to achieve their objectives, often ideological, political, religious, and social. Okunade et al., (2021) state that the insurgency movements' primary goal was/is to replace the existing government to legitimise and commensurate with their objectives. There are two types of insurgencies: the classical insurgency, which thrives towards removing foreign invaders from their territorial land or filling the power vacuum, and the contemporary insurgency, which aims to replace the existing order to occupy the space.

Literature reviews indicate that Cabo Delgado insurgency is the latter one seeking to replace the legitimate government. According to Bissada (2020, p 2), the insurgency resulted from the discoveries of oil and gas deposits made several years prior in the province. Furthermore, Bissada states that the infiltration began in 2017 when fighters carrying Islamic (ISIS) flags denounced the state and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), i.e., the ruling party while targeting isolated security posts. The International Crisis Group Report (2021, p. 21) also acknowledged the insurgency and detailed the events. Nhantumbo (2021) provides a clear overview of how the insurgencies began, detailing that the first significant event took place on 05 October 2017, a day after the Peace Day celebration where the simultaneous terrorist attacks took place in the town of Mocímboa da Praia and Awasse outpost (Pav) where the Forests Resources Protection agents were stationed, about 45 km from Mocímboa da Praia. The insurgency group then retreated to Maculo village, 35 km north, where a flag was erected with the writing "God is Mighty" in Arabic. Another violent attack followed these attacks in Palma, where the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant was under construction. Arguably, this attack raised the alarm to the government about the severity of the attacks. Bosman and Gruzd (2022) argue that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) revealed threats of extreme violence and governance issues in Mozambique roughly ten years ago. In other words, the African Peer Review Mechanisms (APRM) reviews of 2003 and 2018 revealed the high possibility of armed conflict in the country. The APRM identified the threats and left it to the government to mitigate the risks for sustainable peacebuilding and stability. After the first attacks in 2017, the government deployed the Unidade Intervenção Rápida, a particular police unit, to Cado Delgado province as a first step in response (Bosman & Gruzd 2022). The conflict brings about natural resource governance challenges, mainly in practice. Cusak (1995) highlights an important issue that African civil conflicts are primarily attributed to structural economic facets and political and social conditions. From Cubak's lens, Sithole (2022) asserts that the host of issues, such as financial exclusion to natural resource politics, poverty, and state fragility, exacerbated the insurgency. The paper examines the statement through the lens of good governance theory.

2.2 Good Governance Theory

Hazelton (2017, p. 83) defines good governance as a systematic belief that the government is responsible for creating economic, political, and social reforms to lift its communities and mitigate the risk of running through complaints and grievances that might exacerbate insurgencies. In other words, good governance is a contemporary rhetoric essential political initiative helping to end insurgencies. Thus, good governance is a necessary political tool in ending insurgencies because it is through lousy governance that

insurgencies emerge. Connable and Libicki (2010, p.144) assert that insurgencies emerge from “root-cause discontent”. For Mozambique, the root cause of the insurgency, as captured by Sithole (2022), can be attributed to a lack of jobs, low income, and no civil participation in the extractive industry. In other words, economic, political, and social marginalisation often conflict over natural resources in the African context. This is because governments and foreign investors often exclude the landowners (residents) in the economic and political discussions of natural resources. According to Kocher et al., (2011), good governance theory only promotes non-violent counterinsurgency to respond to armed conflict. This view refutes the idea that brute force and victimisation of civilians and perpetrators are pointless. Gilmore (2011, p. 22) confirms that good governance is an active practice of ongoing communication between governments and communities to gain trust and deliver on the manifestos (promises). In other words, open communication between governments and communities strengthens relations and limits any threat of conflicts between the two parties. Gilmore adds that the negative and spiral out of control conflict can be watered down and overturned by good governance. Furthermore, good governance can address even old discontent issues that could connect with underdevelopment, insecurity, and violence that might have been previously overlooked. SADC indirectly applied the excellent governance theory in its strategies to mitigate the Cabo Delgado insurgency by ensuring that open multilateral dialogue occurs before any regional action is taken. While Hazelton (2017) points out that the theory has been criticised for lacking theoretical diligence and thin assumptions in supporting the research, the same could be inferred from terrorism studies as it only supports brute force above all based on its position with normative politics, power, and state-centric ideologies.

Good governance theory in the context of Cabo Delgado through SADC; the approach aimed to ensure national prosperity, creating reliability, predictability, and accountability between involved parties. The bloc values the rule of law and democratic institutional and constitutional processes. The SADC region believes in discourse and table discussions and less in physical force unless the conflict requires it. In Cabo Delgado, SADC approached the conflict through dialogue and negotiations. In its discourse, the primary and central theme was the rule of law in ensuring that the writings of the general principles are binding and, therefore, will bring peace and stability. By upholding the rule of law, SADC ensures that democratic processes are maintained while strengthening and constitutional institutions remain legitimate in their functions and jurisdictions. The SADC multilateral intervention was to ensure that Mozambique was not isolated. However, as the conflict diffuses, one cannot altogether trust in the agreements. Historically, SADC's weakness is that it does not enforce the agreements. Instead, once it maintains peace and achieves accords, it leaves the conflict area and moves to another mission. In the past, as seen with the DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Burundi, the accords were usually short-lived and dismantled by the powerful political elites. Sustainable peace, security, and development must remain an ongoing cause for SADC. The latest report by the Inter Press Services, as reported on 17 January 2024, is that the insurgency has decreased due to the high deployment of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), Southern African Development Community (SAMIM) forces, and a contingent of Rwandan troops (RSF) and thus, researchers predicts that the normalcy will be realised towards the end of 2024.

The SADC heads of state indicated in the July 2023 summit that SADC forces will begin to leave Cabo Delgado by 15 December 2024 and complete the withdrawal by 15 July 2025 (Humphrey, 2024). The SADC decision reflects good governance that respects sovereignty, the rule of law, and the democratic process and shows confidence in the constitutional institutions to enforce regulations. However, monitoring and evaluation intelligence should remain to ensure the checks and balances to keep the bloc abreast of any or non-developments in the area.

2.3 Classification of cases

The case of Zimbabwe and Madagascar

SADC mediation efforts are majorly on a case-by-case basis and rely on country leaders (usually past political leaders and retired judges) to act as mediators and representatives of the bloc. This is often done in their personal capacity with minimal collective influence and input from other countries' leaders. Usually, SADC mediation interventions are classified into three fluid sets: (1) election-related disputes, (2) political impasse, and (3) where the military has usurped power. SADC intervened in Zimbabwe due to election-related disputes and in Madagascar, where the military usurped power (Deleglise, 2021). In 2009, there was a coup case in Madagascar. These countries have seen a common action from SADC because while the cases were different and approached on a case-by-case, they all had common factors of the legitimacy and the legality of political power, which caused conflict. However, in managing the conflict, SADC applied relatively similar approaches and resources to suit the case at hand, and these ranged from mediation actors, the country's capabilities and capacities, and the country's geostrategic features all relating to the conflict (Deleglise, 2021).

A case of Zimbabwe – Quiet Diplomacy as an effective conflict resolution strategy

SADC mediation occurred in two stages in Zimbabwe. In 2007, the bloc mandated the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition due to international advocacy against the intimidation and abuse of power on opposition activists. Initially, SADC was disinclined and unwilling to recognise the factors resulting in conflict from the grassroots level and simply alleged that the dispute resulted from the need for land distribution caused by the Western sanctions (Cawthra, 2010). In SADC's view, there were no governance, political, or security concerns, as stated in their efforts for mediation interventions. In SADC's initial involvement through their mediator, President Mbeki, the focus was on institutional conditions to be reviewed for the upcoming 2008 national general elections despite the overt violence under the ruling government. After five months of negotiations and mediation, constitutional amendment No. 18 was agreed upon and later adopted by the Zimbabwean parliament. However, Michael Aeby criticises this agreement, which the ruling party government unilaterally drafted, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Rupiya, 2013). A key amendment was for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to review and reformulate constituency boundaries subject to parliamentary approval before the elections (Aeby, 2017). Others again criticised the SADC mediator when the government set the election earlier than anticipated, stating that

the reason was to oppose further reforms (Aeby, 2017). The election took place in March 2008, and Zimbabwean scholars such as Eldred Masunungure allege that the elections were unfair since foreign observers considered untrustworthy by the government did not receive accreditation. When election results began to show a decline in the ruling party and an increase in the major opposition, the ZEC halted the live updates of the counting of votes and results. These results were frozen for five weeks, and during this period, SADC mediators remained mum and waited with the citizens and international audience for the ZEC's next move. During this period, massive protests occurred throughout the country. The results were later reported inconclusive, and the ruling government extended the counting period to three months. Conclusively, the opposition leader and the contender, Morgan Tsvangirai, withdrew from the race, and subsequently, Mugabe remained the President with 85.5 percent of the votes (SADC, 2008). While the SADC and AU observers criticised the ZEC and ZANU-PF in the manner in which the elections were conducted, much emphasis was placed on the primary SADC mediator, President Mbeki, to speak up about the alleged illegitimacy of the 2008 electoral win (Rupiya, 2011). Later, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed under Mbeki's leadership between the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the ZANU-PF in July 2008 to also commit to the discourse for the conclusion of the Global Political Agreement (GPA); which they did in September 2008. GPA provided guidelines for a transitional government, mandated, including others, to develop the country's culture and principles for free and fair elections by drafting the constitution, holding a referendum, cohesion, national unity, security sector reform, national healing, equality, and ZEC anti-corruption—human right commission and media commission Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach in Zimbabwe reflects good governance principles, as explained by Addink (2017, p. 02). When analysing the conduct and implications, Mbeki's decisions and actions were informed by (1) the rule of law dimension, which is related to the values, (2) democracy dimension, which relates to the control of by the majority with each individual having a say, and (3) institutional dimension, which relies on the constitutional values. These dimensions and values are considered sources of the concept of good governance concept Addink (2017, p. 02). For these reasons, Mbeki's quiet diplomacy to its proponents meant conducting conflicts and negotiations civilly and diplomatically, which ensured national, regional, and international security (Dlamini, 2002, p. 172). In other words, the approach meant building trust with all the involved parties to end conflict and make peace. Additionally, the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs minister retaliated against the South African role, stating that the broader goal was to avoid further collapse of Zimbabwe and bring sustainable peace and stability. This approach is not new in the international system; Britain took the same stance as the US on the Kyoto Protocol, for example, thus the absence of President W Bush at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in his approach to the war on terror in Iraq. For Mbeki, good governance means that the rule of law must be shown and emphasised to protect human rights, democracy, transparency, effectiveness, and accountability (Addink, 2017, p. 02). In other words, the sovereignty of both countries were placed above all. Mediators understood they were responsible for safeguarding their national security to protect their countries and Zimbabwe. In this way, a precedent was set to affirm the government of Zimbabwe that the rule of law and institutions will be the primary guideline in ensuring good governance in mediation.

Despite its ability to exert force, Mbeki understood the implication of retaliation and how the region could be destabilised. Even when appointed as a primary mediator by the SADC bloc, South Africa, through Mbeki, opted for a multilateral approach to gain international legitimacy. Ultimately, the SADC region achieved stability in Zimbabwe even though the country still faces Western sanctions. The regional bloc's success is measured by its ability to maintain peace, negotiate settlements, and uphold the rule of law while promoting human rights and good governance in conflict resolution.

A case of Madagascar - A victory for SADC's 'quiet diplomacy'.

SADC's intervention in Madagascar resulted from the military usurping power. Andry Rajoelina led a decisive coup d'état and toppled President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. Similar to Zimbabwe, a former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, was appointed to lead the negotiations, while the AU and UN-appointed their lead mediators. International communities are always relating the slow progress of the bloc. Nonetheless, Deleglise (2021) states that SADC reached a milestone when a compromise was achieved through the power-sharing accord. Later, the agreement was breached and failed, yet the SADC team persevered. Later, Chissano was removed, and for almost two years, the negotiations reached a dead-end with both parties, and the bloc called for a "neither-nor" solution to force compliance (Deleglise, 2021). Later, both parties conceded, and a liaison office was set up in April 2012, followed by the elections in 2013. Civilian management and control remained a challenge for the bloc. In September 2015, a "Special Envoy's advance team" was sent to Madagascar and reported back to the bloc that the leaders were cooperative, engaged with the special envoy team and appreciative of providing guidance and support for the national reconciliation process (Deleglise, 2021) In the end, SADC's victory on 07 November 2009 was a power-sharing deal signed by both parties and the creation of a co-president. This deal included the transitional cabinet members, council members and advisors and a transitional parliament made up of 258 members in total. In conclusion, the quiet approach in Madagascar focused on considerable aspects of mediation more than procedural aspects compared with the case of Zimbabwe. In its good governance, the mediators focused on applying the subjects in pursuing them. The spokesperson of the Department of International Relations in South Africa, Clayson Monyela, told the local newspaper, Daily Maverick on 17 January 2013, that "South Africa housed Ravalomanana, the main protagonist during the negotiations. His place of residency was conducive to the mediators because he was accessible. This shortened the communication time and made it almost immediate, particularly in pursuing him to see reasons". (Allison, 2013). In other words, mediators use all soft power skills to achieve their mandate by any means necessary.

3. Methods Multilateral approach


De Wijk et al. (2020) state that multilateralism is a complex and demanding sustainable approach because of the conflicting states' priorities and interests. It is even more challenging for smaller states as they lack hegemonic power, are often reactive, and prefer the status quo, unlike superpower and central power states. However, multilateralism is a political tool both small and big powers can use to influence and

restrain power. SADC countries understood the power of multilateral discourse on action towards Cabo Delgado. This is because multilateralism leads to sustainable peace and security, and cooperation is even greater for sustainable development (Keohane, 1990). International relations are transformed through international cooperation of multilateralism. In other words, states follow international rules of engagement even if these rules are not in the state's short-term interests. This does not mean altruism but is based on the premise that multilateralism pays off in the long term (De Wijk et al., 2020). Ikenberry (2018) explains and lists conditions for multilateralism that is based on the liberal internationalism logic that (1) provides openness in trade and exchange, (2) commitment to a rules-based set of relations, (3) security cooperations in some form, (4) ideology that power politics can be "tamed" by building solid relations in pursuit of mutual gains, (5) liberal internationalism will advance liberal democracy. Multilateral cooperation is achieved through inter-nation and supranational means. For the latter, multilateral cooperation can be achieved through institutions such as the African Union or the European Union, where nations sign a treaty and give away some of their sovereignty power for additional sustainability and stability. The former is when nations guard their sovereignty with membership in institutions such as NATO or SADC (Etzioni, 2018). Superpower states use instrumental, while small states generally engage in functional multilateralism. This is because small states do not have the power to influence global policies; however, they can deal with security-related issues within their regions using the global institution framework and guidance from organisations such as the United Nations (De Wijk et al., 2020). And this was the case in the response of the SADC region in Cado Delgado.

4. Towards conceptual framework


Maxwell (2005, p. 4) defines conceptual framework as a process where the author engages with fundamental ideas such as what is the problem, primary issues, settings, and people involved. What are the beliefs, preferences, personal experiences, understanding, and existing literature which will inform the subject/s under investigation? These questions are then arranged logically in a structural form to guide the researcher in examining, proving, affirming, or validating the preconceived relations between keywords, thus forming a coherent research study.

This study adopted the multilateral approach in dealing with the armed conflict in Mozambique.



Military Intervention timeline

Nhamiree (2023); Bussotti and Coimbra (2023)




4.1 Methods

4.2.1 Surveys and results


In October 2023, the Ipsos Group, a multinational market research and consulting firm, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and Afro Barometer, released a statistical research report on Mozambique Afrobarometer is a network or survey research that is pan-African and non-partisan and conducts field research interviews on African experiences, governance, quality of life, human rights, and evaluations of democratic governments and processes. The network has undertaken research in over forty countries since 1999. In its field research in Mozambique led by Ipsos, the group sat down with over a thousand adults nationwide between October and December of 2022. The results revealed that most of the population believed in government interventions and applauded them for effectiveness, but the slim majority criticised the SADC bloc. This group have expressed less confidence in the bloc and more in the government of Mozambique. However, the group does not realise that according to the diplomatic interventions, the bloc only becomes involved when the government cannot maintain domestic security, which has the potential to spill over into the region. SADC and the Rwandan military intervened timeously with the diplomatic efforts to strengthen regional and international security in support of the government. The Afrobarometer team had previously conducted similar interviews in Mozambique in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, and 2021. In the latest consolidated statistics, the network found that there is ninety-five percent confidence in government and diplomatic interventions of SADC and the Rwandan military.

Figure 1: Government effectiveness in addressing armed extremists | Mozambique | 2022




Respondents were asked: How effective do you think the Mozambican government has been in its efforts to address the problem of armed extremists in this country?


Figure 2: Confidence in ability to help resolve conflict in Cabo Delgado | Mozambique | 2022




Respondents were asked: How much confidence do you have in each of the following actors to help in resolving the conflict in Cabo Delgado?

Figure 3: Best strategy to address conflict in Cabo Delgado | Mozambique | 2022

Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following factors would you say would be the best strategy to address the ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado?

Figure 4: Main reason people join extremist groups | Mozambique | 2022

Respondents were asked: There are many reasons why people join armed extremist groups in Cabo Delgado. In your opinion, what would you say is the main reason people join extremist groups in our country?

Figure 5: Who supports extremist groups? | Mozambique | 2022

Respondents were asked: How many of the following people do you think are involved in supporting and assisting the extremist groups that have launched attacks and kidnappings in Mozambique, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Adopted from the Afrobarometer 19 October 2023 report

<http://www.afrobarometer.org/>

4.3 Results of the short-lived and shortfalls of the SADC interventions: Lesotho, Burundi, and DRC

A case of Lesotho – coalition building.

According to Nantulya (2018), Lesotho experienced coups in 1970, 1986, 1991, and 1994, when the 1998 and all related to elections. The recent coup attempt was in 2014. SADC has been involved in peace agreements in Lesotho and even established an Interim Political Authority (IPA) to ensure and implement the reforms to maintain stability. Despite these measures in place by the regional bloc, Lesotho continues to be embroiled in conflict during election times and, most recently, in the 2007 and 2014 elections, where coups were attempted together with the assassination of Prime Minister Tom Thabane in 2015. While unsuccessful, the two army chiefs of staff and multiple senior police officials were not fortunate and succumbed to the infighting in 2015 and 2017. This led to more apparent conflict in political spaces where politicians found ways to manipulate the SADC peace agreements. For instance, the Interim Political Authority (IPA) implemented the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system that increased parliament seats to 120, 80 of which were contested through "first-past-the-post voting, i.e., tied to constituencies and 40 of which using the proportional representation. Later, politicians found ways to manipulate the electoral rules for greater control, such as the SADC-negotiated system, which states the proportional representation of coalitions with surrogate parties, which subsequently undermined the systems and legitimacy of the election process. Another manipulation way is what is known as the "floor crossing", where members switch support in parliament by depriving their known allegiances of supporting other matters as a form of punishment, resulting in new alliances, scheming, and ultimately forcing elections through a dead-end mechanism. This is a significant failure

of SADC efforts in maintaining stability since 2011 because, since 2012, this has been the opposition's successful method of destabilisation and has thus toppled three governments (Nantulya, 2018).

A case of Burundi – power-sharing.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000 was intended to end the country's re-occurring conflict, which included two genocide episodes. The essential settlements included power-sharing objectives, equitable participation in government structures and military representation to support and influence coalitions across ethnic groups, checks and balances, security provisions, and accountable good governance. The settlement also adopted Lesotho's model to discourage power concentration, and again, IPA arrangements were borrowed into the Arusha agreement. This meant that coalitions could not be more than 67 percentage points of central and local government and 60 percent of state institutions, even with majority votes. While in the military, ethnic inclusion was obligatory, meaning that one ethnic group could not be 50 percentage points in the majority. Additionally, the military possessed autonomy in policy management and operational management decisions. Almost immediately, military power was tested in 2013 when the government voted for a declaration of a state of emergency to respond to the internal civilian unrest. The military responded that the statement lacked authenticity since the motion was politically motivated. Inversely, in 2015, the military ministry supported the civilian protests against President Pierre Nkurunziza's quest for third-term re-election and went on to enforce the Arusha Accords by allowing peaceful protests as the freedom of movement and regularly placing the police in protest-prone areas. Ten years later, the Arusha Accords were effective and still being praised, except that the quality of enforcement was declining. For ten years, the accords were successful in advancing reforms, peace, security, and stability. However, the Nkurunziza's pursuit of a third term was the tip of the iceberg, which led to unending protests, civilian loss of life, a failed coup, the discovery of mass graves, political leaders corruption, charges of crimes against humanity and forced migration of more than 500 000 people. SADC's effective and successful measures through the Arusha Accord were dismantled in 2016 when the state commission positioned itself with the ruling party and made recommendations for presidential term limits, thus reverting to a majoritarian system previously used. Immediately, the country reverted to the system that caused internal conflicts and meant that the ruling party with the majority would control everything. In turn, this weakens the independence of the military and undoes the work. While SADC succeeded in the negotiations, signing, and implementation, it lacked the directive and control to stop the reverse. The AU and UN then tried to intervene but failed, particularly without the regional bloc SADC, which championed and successfully signed the deal. This indicates the lack of SADC's mechanism in ongoing monitoring and evaluations of the agreements, often leaving the conflicting parties to work together in nation-building (Nantulya, 2018).

A Case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – checks and balances.

After years of civil wars in the DRC, the agreement was reached in 2002, named the Sun City Accords, which created a decisive legislative branch to act as an inspector, monitoring, and evaluator of the executive branch. Unfortunately, at the time, the new ruling party was a minority, and the accords recommended coalition building. At the time, the ruling government held minority seats in the new parliament, with only 54 out of 500 seats. The opposition parties' civil society occupied the rest of the seats, all whilst the former ruling party had control of the oversight committees and the opposition parties and civil society had power over the strategic key area, i.e., the parliament speaker. Four years into the new setup, the culture of accountability became a norm in the new parliament, where robust engagements were being accepted, particularly on the presidential conduct oversight. By the seventh year, over forty oral questions had been raised in parliament, particularly about the conduct and relationships of the state's entity officials and government officials. This led to twenty-eight independent investigations of misconduct within parliament. Thus, the Sun City Accords went downhill from this point on, leading to the removal of the speaker of parliament. This resulted in frustration within the executive branch since the centre could not hold, and the loyalists of President Joseph Kabila managed to increase their seats. The supermajority provided fertile ground for passing the raft of partisan bills, which is worth mentioning, as it allowed Kabila to stay in office in case of a delay in elections. Thus, the two-round runoff rule achieved in the accords was removed.

In the end, a raft of partisan bills offered Kabila suitable terms of office with a mere 49 percent of the votes in the 2011 elections and the veneer of legitimacy for his continuation to remain in office even after his second term had expired in December 2016. While the Sun City Accord showed good governance, particularly with the employment of inspectors to monitor and evaluate the executive branch for checks and balances, the SADC implementation strategy failed to recognise the power of influence, particularly in institutions such as the courts. Many allege that the Constitutional Court halted the accords, so they are only effective from 2015, almost ten years after the adoption. The allegation of constitutional judges captured by Kabila was the word of the day. In 2016, the allegations were vindicated when the court ruled that the bill allowing Kabila to remain in office if elections are delayed is constitutional. This led to Kabila gaining more power because he was approved by the Supreme Court to allow him to divide the country's provinces and appoint new governors. Appoint new governors in the twenty-six provinces using the 2006 constitutional provision, allowing him to divide the country (Nantulya, 2018). Eventually, Kabila conceded in 2019, even though he still influenced parliament seats to the new opposition President Félix Tshisekedi.

Conclusively, the SADC mediation intervention in its member state is of a more superficial responsibility. Analysing these three countries, one thing is consistent: the bloc commits to tasks and ensures stability and peaceful resolution. What the bloc lacks is an accountable mechanism with real consequences. The SADC bloc faces the challenge of political elites pursuing to ensure the status quo remains. These elites collaborate to ensure that the entrenched legacies of malpractices of the government, parliament, and institutions remain in power. They are against the reform, particularly those that envision accountability, good governance, and strong and sustainable institutions. While SADC

mediators approach each conflict through the framework of sovereignty and the rule of law and eventually reach an amicable agreement, these agreements lack solid civil liberties protections, particularly against political elites. SADC has invested interest in regional stability that it takes on interventions at a relatively acceptable level and times. However, it neglects that the success of peace agreements relies on solid institutions and continuous bloc support. Until these agreements address the challenges mentioned above, the reoccurrences will continue, as in the case of Burundi, DRC, Lesotho, and Madagascar.

5. Discussion of the limitations and challenges SADC faces

Four crucial factors that justify SADC intervention are that (1) member state is facing security threats and the bloc is obligated to intervene (2) states must promote and maintain peace and security as stated in under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992, (3) member states must safeguard, defend, and maintain regional peace against any security threats as stated under Article 2, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, and (4) peace must be achieved through peaceful means necessary and promote community-based approaches to internal security (Deleglise, 2021). The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation policy brief 34, released in July 2021, details the three challenges SADC faces in its intervention: (1) the lack and absence of shared values in member states. Some are democratic, while others have authoritarian tendencies in domestic policy affairs and militaristic and pacific orientations in their foreign policies, (2) reluctant views of SADC members to concede a measure of sovereignty to a security cluster, and (3) the underdeveloped administrative process within the bloc ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the SADC's agreements and measures (Nathan, 2012). Therefore, although the bloc can achieve a roadmap and accords to maintain peace and stability, history has indicated they are likely short-lived (The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2021, p. 3).

6. Conclusion, Implications, and further research

Diplomatically, SADC has the legal, moral, and security validity and justification for intervening and mediating in Mozambique. The bloc also has the latitude to negotiate and mediate between the government and the identified interlocutors. This is because of the terms of scope of the bloc: to maintain domestic stability and to prevent spillage in the region, the bloc is mandated to provide military troops, intelligence, technical assistance, military equipment, and maritime security for corporations. Conclusively, military intervention since the Cold War has been an active means to stop an active armed conflict. The paper explored the excellent governance theory as an unexplored method that could also prevent armed conflict. Thus, armed conflict in Africa and Mozambique is often due to the discoveries of natural resources and, subsequently, a need for more governance in making the extraction processes inclusive. It is now upon the Mozambique government to tighten the loose ends by ensuring sustainability, peace, and security by inclusively ensuring that communities benefit from natural resources. Inclusivity guarantees and strengthens patriotism, and no foreign group or individuals will attempt to recruit the locals into insurgent groups or against the government. The SADC bloc response was

timeous and continues with the military intervention propositions to not spill over into other neighbouring regions while aiming to prevent loss of life and uphold human rights. SADC's conduct and actions reflect the characteristics of good governance theory. While some scholars argue that the multilateral processes are distant, detached from democratic institutions, lack sufficient input from ordinary citizens, and are slow and overly bureaucratic, the process is required for the long-term stability of states and sustainable development plans. The intervention mechanisms and strategies from regional blocs, the EU and the US are rebuilding the communities of Cabo Delgado province, and these initiatives' tangible results will be realised in the long term. Political intervention is a long-term goal instead of a short-term goal. Future research studies should focus on how the SADC member states are individually guarding their borders against this armed conflict. Good governance theory in the context of Cabo Delgado. The SADC approach aimed to ensure national prosperity, creating reliability, predictability, and accountability between involved parties. The bloc values the rule of law and democratic institutional and constitutional processes. The SADC region believes in discourse and table discussions and less in physical force unless the conflict requires it. In Cabo Delgado, SADC approached the conflict through dialogue and negotiations. In its discourse, the primary and central theme was the rule of law in ensuring that the writings of the general principles are binding and, therefore, will bring peace and stability. By upholding the rule of law, SADC ensures that democratic processes are maintained while strengthening and constitutional institutions remain legitimate in their functions and jurisdictions. The SADC multilateral intervention was to ensure that Mozambique was not isolated. However, as the conflict diffuses, one cannot altogether trust in the agreements. Historically, SADC's weakness is that it does not enforce the agreements. Instead, once it maintains peace and achieves accords, it leaves the conflict area and moves to another mission. In the past, as seen with the DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Burundi, the accords were usually short-lived and dismantled by the powerful political elites. Sustainable peace, security, and development must remain an ongoing cause for SADC. The latest report by the Inter Press Services, as reported on 17 January 2024, is that the insurgency has decreased due to the high deployment of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), Southern African Development Community (SAMIM) forces, and a contingent of Rwandan troops (RSF) and thus, researchers predicts that the normalcy will be realised towards the end of 2024. The SADC heads of state indicated in the July 2023 summit that SADC forces will begin to leave Cabo Delgado by 15 December 2024 and complete the withdrawal by 15 July 2025. The SADC decision reflects good governance that respects sovereignty, the rule of law, and the democratic process and shows confidence in constitutional institutions to enforce regulations.

Acknowledgement:

FOR SAHUDA: The financial assistance of the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, in collaboration with the South African Humanities Deans Association towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NIHSS and SAHUDA.

References

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. Finance and Development-English Edition, 49(1), 53.
- Addink, G. H. (2017). Good governance: importance in practice, theories and definitions. *Halu Oleo Law Review*, 1(1), 1-32.
- Aeby, M. (2017). Stability and sovereignty at the expense of democracy? The SADC mediation mandate for Zimbabwe, 2007–2013. *African Security*, 10(3-4), 272-291
- Afrobarometer. (2023). Majority of Mozambicans say government has been effective in resolving conflict in Cabo Delgado. News release 19 October. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/News-release-Mozambicans-say-govt-has-been-effective-in-resolving-conflict-in-Cabo-Delgado-Afrobarometer-19oct23-1.pdf>
- Agreement, G. P. (2008). Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe. *Harare*, 15, 2008.
- Bissada, A. M. (2020). Mozambique: Can Cabo Delgado's Islamist insurgency be Stopped?. *The Africa Report*.
- Bosman, I., & Gruzd, S. (2022). Cabo Delgado threat identified a decade ago – Did the government listen? *South African Institute of International Affairs*.
- Bouchard, C., & Peterson, J. (2011). Conceptualising multilateralism: Can we all just get along?. *Mercury E-paper*, 1.
- Bussotti, L., & Coimbra, E. J. (2023). Struggling the Islamic State in austral Africa: The SADC military intervention in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) and its limits. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 5, 1122373.
- Cawthra, G. (2010). The role of SADC in managing political crisis and conflict: The cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe.
- Connable, B., & Libicki, M. C. (2010). *How insurgencies end* (Vol. 965). Rand Corporation.
- Cusak, T. R. (1995). *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War*.
- Deleglise, D. (2021). Trends in SADC mediation and long-term conflict transformation. *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners*, 215-233.
- de Wijk, R., Thompson, J., & Chavannes, E. (2020). Adjusting the multilateral system to safeguard Dutch interests. *Hague Centre for Strategic Studies*.
- Dlamini, K. (2002). Is quiet diplomacy an effective conflict resolution strategy. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, 3, 171-78.
- Dzinesa, G. A. (2023). The Southern African Development Community's Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Policymaking and Effectiveness. *International Peacekeeping*, 30(2), 198-229.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order?. *International Affairs*, 94(1), 7-23.
- Etzioni, A. (2018). The Rise (More) Nation-Centered System. *Fletcher F. World Aff.*, 42, 29.
- Gilmore, J. (2011). A kinder, gentler counter-terrorism: Counterinsurgency, human security and the War on Terror. *Security Dialogue*, 42(1), 21-37.
- Hazelton, J. L. (2017). The “hearts and minds” fallacy: Violence, coercion, and success in counterinsurgency warfare. *International Security*, 42(1), 80-113.
- Hellesen, P. (2008). *Counterinsurgency and its implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces* (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School).
- Humphrey, K. (2014). Mozambique Insurgency Significantly Decreased, Say Experts. *Inter Press Service News Agency*. 17 January 2024.
- Keohane, R. O. (1990). Multilateralism: an agenda for research. *International journal*, 45(4), 731-764.
- Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency redux. *Survival*, 48(4), 111-130.
- Kocher, M. A., Pepinsky, T. B., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2011). Aerial bombing and counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2), 201-218.
- Laqueur, W. (2004). The terrorism to come. *Policy Review*, 126(1), 49-64.
- Louw-Vaudran, L., Attah-Asamoah, A., Woldemichael, S., Handy, P. S., & Diatta, M. (2020). Why is SADC slow to intervene in political crises?. *ISS Peace and Security Council Report*, 2020(127), 10-11.
- Maxwell, J. A. (2012). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. Sage publications.

- Meadowcroft, J. (2013). Who is in charge here? Governance for sustainable development in a complex world. In *Governance for sustainable development* (pp. 107-122). Routledge.
- Mroszczyk, J., & Abrahms, M. (2021). Terrorism in Africa: explaining the rise of extremist violence against civilians. *E-International Relations*.
- Nantulya, P. (2018). When Peace Agreements Fail: Lessons from Lesotho, Burundi, and DRC. African Center for Strategic Studies.
- Nathan, L. (2016). Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa. Routledge.
- Nhamiree, B. (2023). Cabo Delgado: two years since the Palma invasion. The Institute for Security Studies.
- Okunade, S. K., Faluyi, O. T., & Matambo, E. (2021). Evolving patterns of insurgency in Southern and West Africa: Refocusing the Boko Haram lens on Mozambique. *African Security Review*, 30(4), 434-450.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1992). Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution. *International organization*, 46(3), 561-598.
- Rupiya, M. R. (Ed.). (2013). Zimbabwe's military: examining its veto power in the transition to democracy, 2008-2013. The African Public Policy & Research Institute.
- Rupiya, M. (2012). Negotiators' failure on security sector reform. In a joint seminar of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) and the African Public Policy and Research Institute: Towards Ensuring Free and Fair Elections: SADC/Zimbabwe Road Map: Civil Society Role (s) and Challenges.
- Rupiya, M. (2011). The military factor in Zimbabwe's political and electoral affairs.
- Siegel, L. J. (2015). *Criminology: Theories, patterns, and typologies*. Cengage Learning.
- Sithole, T. (2022). The Political Economy of Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Insurgency and its Impact on Southern Africa's Regional Security. *Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science*, 52, 4-29.
- South African Institute of International Affairs. (2022, September 9). Cabo Delgado threat identified a decade ago - Did government listen? - SAIIA. SAIIA. <https://saiia.org.za/research/cabo-delgado-threat-identified-a-decade-ago-did-govt-listen/>
- The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. (2021). National and regional responses to the Cabo Delgado crisis: Failures and opportunities for change. Policy Brief Number 34, July 2021. <https://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/IJR-Policy-Brief-Cabo-Delgado-09July-2021.pdf>