

Sustainability of Cultural Practices in Ukraine During the War: Challenges and Threats

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ABSTRACT:

The article presents the results of the author's All-Ukrainian telephone survey on the topic: "Cultural Practices of the Population of Ukraine during the War". The survey was conducted from June 15 to June 30, 2023 and covered 1,000 adult respondents from all regions of Ukraine, except for the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas, as well as areas without Ukrainian mobile communication. The margin of error of the sample does not exceed 2.2%. The article argues that under current conditions, state support for cultural institutions is crucial for Ukraine, and a nationwide strategy for cultural development has become a pressing need. All of this is necessary because only distancing from Russian culture, independence from it, and self-sufficiency are Ukraine's only chance to maintain its agency as a state and preserve its national identity. The stable development of national culture and the formation of a resilient national identity will protect the country from territorial encroachments in the future and help in regaining the occupied territories. Most importantly, they will contribute to the cultural reintegration of the population of these territories, returning them to Ukraine's national cultural space.

Keywords: resilience, cultural resilience, sustainable development, war, internally displaced persons (IDPs), respondents, citizens of Ukraine, national values, threats, cultural space.

1. Introduction

Cultural resilience is directly linked to sustainable development. According to UNESCO documents "culture provides the necessary transformative dimension that ensures the sustainability of development processes" (UNESCO, 2019). Cultural resilience is one of the three pillars of sustainable development, but it can also be considered an independent fourth pillar of society due to its significance and impact on all other areas of public life, such as politics, economy, and ecology (Soini K. & Birkland I., 2014). First mentioned in 1995, cultural resilience offered effective social policy tools for addressing sustainable development issues. The importance of cultural resilience lies precisely in the extent of its influence on decision-making in the context of societal development, as the

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quality of such decisions largely depends on the system of cultural values and beliefs of that society (Bender O. & Haller A., 2017).

Thus, the resilience of sustainable development in society is directly connected to the preservation of cultural beliefs, customs and cultural heritage. Culture simultaneously drives the economic, social and environmental aspects of societal sustainable development, and resilience is defined as the ability to maintain, evolve and develop.

Cultural resilience can also be seen as a fundamental basis and prerequisite that must be fulfilled on the path to sustainable development. This is a new way of thinking about sustainability, which takes a comprehensive view of all human activities aimed at sustaining the human way of life. Therefore, cultural resilience involves a continuous reflection on what is sustainable in the human way of life and what should be changed. However, the theoretical and conceptual understanding of cultural resilience within the broader framework of sustainable development remains undefined.

In 2015, participants of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development, during the preparation of Agenda 2030, attempted to include culture in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In these discussions, culture was defined as "a factor that contributes to achieving other sustainable development goals and is, in itself, a goal of development" (Soini K. & Birkland I., 2014). However, in the final document adopted by the UN General Assembly, culture exists as a development goal in its own right. It is mentioned in connection with terms such as "civilization", "diversity", "interculturality", "cultural heritage" and "tourism" in four areas: quality education (SDG4); decent work and economic growth (SDG8); sustainable cities and communities (SDG11); responsible consumption and production (Duxbury N., Kangas A. & De Beukelaer C., 2017).

Understanding cultural resilience as a necessary component of sustainable development can be achieved through research within interdisciplinary approaches (Loach K., Rowley J. & Griffiths J., 2015). This means studying the experience of integrating culture into social policy, practical areas of public life and developing a system of indicators to assess the impact of culture on sustainable development.

The category "cultural practice" is an important scientific definition in various humanities disciplines: culturology, sociology, anthropology, etc. It reflects an integrated system of interactions and communications among individuals, groups, institutions, and transnational subjects of social life. In the real cultural space, cultural practices change according to historical, economic, and sociocultural changes while simultaneously retaining their core essential properties, thus having a transcultural nature and semantic prognostic projections (Sudakova V., 2020).

Cultural practices reflect the basic system of values, structure fundamental areas of everyday life that are recognized by all members of a given society, and are crucial for forming individual and group identity. In applied culturology, culture is increasingly viewed as practices – forms of human interaction that are established and allow for the production,

preservation, and transmission of cultural characteristics of society. Cultural practices include processes related to the creation and realization of various cultural phenomena, forms, and texts – from artworks and cultural heritage objects to festivals and creative clusters.

Modern Ukraine faces new challenges and threats amidst the full-scale war waged by Russia against the Ukrainian state. There is ample evidence proving the systematic and targeted nature of Russian attacks on Ukrainian culture. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy reports damage or destruction of over 1,987 cultural infrastructure objects (as of April 25, 2024) (1987 cultural infrastructure objects were damaged or destroyed due to Russian aggression, August 10, 2024). In 2023, Minister of Culture and Information Policy O. Tkachenko noted that Russian occupiers removed exhibits from nearly 40 Ukrainian museums. Losses from the looting and destruction of cultural objects are estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Ministry of Culture revealed how many cultural objects were damaged by the war, April 18, 2023). Overall, 958 club facilities, 708 libraries, 153 art education institutions, 114 museums and galleries, 36 theaters, cinemas, and philharmonics, 15 parks, zoos, and reserves, as well as three circuses, have been affected.

Museums, libraries, clubs, cultural centers, art schools, and so on, are institutionalised cultural practices in the state; they are also activities of social cultural institutions. These are the very targets of Russian weaponry. As of May 22, 2024, UNESCO confirmed the damage to 375 objects since February 24, 2022, including 137 religious objects, 172 buildings of historical and/or artistic value, 31 museums, 20 monuments, 14 libraries, and 1 archive. The independent initiative Ukrainian Heritage Monitoring Lab (<https://www.heritage.in.ua/>) researched and documented 784 cultural heritage objects damaged by Russian attacks.

There are also opportunities to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the appropriation and destruction of cultural heritage at the level of national tribunals. In these conditions, attitudes toward Russian culture have fundamentally changed, viewing it as colonial, while at the same time, there is a significant surge of interest in one's own culture. Thus, amidst the consolidation of the political nation in the face of the aggressor, there is a reassessment of cultural values – from changes in street names (Sierhienko O, 2022) to the growing popularity of Ukrainian cultural products (Sushko Ye, 2022). At the same time, due to a significant drop in population incomes, the everyday cultural practices of citizens and, naturally, the national cultural policy have changed.

After the war ends, a complete restoration of Ukraine's destroyed cultural infrastructure will be necessary. Western countries have promised to assist us in this. Ukrainian cultural figures are also convinced that the war could become a catalyst for the emergence of alternative sources of funding for cultural initiatives. The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the war will make Ukraine stronger. The greatest hope

is placed on the Armed Forces of Ukraine; artists also believe that the unity of the Ukrainian people is one of the keys to Victory. At the same time, all respondents objectively assess the possible consequences of the war in terms of financial and material shortages. They understand the wartime requirements, such as reallocating funds from the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation to support the army in its fight against Russian aggression. 57% of cultural figures believe that the war will lead to new sources of cultural funding. 56% are confident that the lack of funds in the cultural sphere will necessitate the development of other directions. 54% believe that the current escalation will stimulate the emergence of new artists and artistic trends in the post-war period. The cultural community needs more information about initiatives, campaigns, and tools to support Ukraine, particularly abroad. The greatest demand (aside from funding) is for informational, coordination, and organizational support. The war has also led to increased interest in everything Ukrainian. Almost 77% of the cultural figures surveyed expect increased demand for Ukrainian culture in general, while 72% foresee a strengthening of the patriotic focus within the country's culture. 51% of cultural figures hope for a break in ties with countries that support Russia's aggression. 66% would like to see not only Russians but also representatives of countries that support the war subjected to a boycott. 51% of cultural figures expect changes in cultural trends within Ukraine, and 44% anticipate such changes globally. These are the results of a survey conducted by the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (Horlach P, 2022).

2. Methodology and Results

The nationwide telephone survey on "Cultural Practices of the Population of Ukraine During the War" was conducted from June 15 to June 30, 2023, covering 1,000 adult respondents from all regions except for the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas and areas without Ukrainian mobile communication. The margin of error is no more than 2.2%. The telephone survey allowed for relatively quick coverage of the entire sample at comparatively low costs (compared to in-person, door-to-door, or street interviews, which are much more time-consuming, logistically challenging and expensive). Additionally, the telephone survey was the most suitable method under wartime conditions. The nationwide sample consisted of 1,000 respondents (including a specified number of respondents from each region, varying by age group and gender). The sample was random at all stages except for the final one, where respondents were selected by quotas, and it is representative of Ukraine's adult population. The general population surveyed included citizens aged 18 to 75 who permanently reside in Ukraine and are not in prisons or medical institutions (hospitals, care homes, etc.). The sample was structured to ensure that all members of the general population had an equal statistical probability of being selected. The socio-demographic characteristics of the selected survey audience corresponded to the distribution of data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of March 1, 2023.

According to the data obtained, popular leisure activities among Ukrainians during the war included watching movies at home, engaging in active recreation, reading books, meeting with friends, browsing social media pages and YouTube. Compared to the previous period, during the war, there has been a significant decline in leisure activities such as active recreation, meeting with friends, going to the cinema, and excursions in one's own and other cities. Instead, there is an increase in leisure practices such as watching movies at home, browsing social media and listening to music.




Fig. 1. Popularity of Leisure Practices

Distribution of responses to the question: "Name four (4) main forms of leisure that were typical for you over the past year"

The war in Ukraine is the reason for this situation, as many forms of leisure are impossible in parts of the country, and where they are possible, they are often threatened with postponement or cancellation due to air-raid alarm. There is also the issue of psychological exhaustion, deprivation, and the moral dilemma of participating in artistic events in a warring country. This last point has significantly influenced the fact that most cultural events and activities are organized to raise funds to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).

During the war, the language aspect of content remained unchanged for just over a quarter of respondents. For the vast majority (78%), it changed.




Fig. 2. Distribution of responses to the question: “Has the language of the content you watch changed?”




Fig. 3. Distribution of responses to the question: “How has the language of the content you watch and read changed? (asked of those whose language content has changed)”

The majority of respondents reported that they began to change their choice of content in terms of language: they either completely stopped or significantly reduced watching and reading content in Russian, opting for Ukrainian instead. Men were slightly more likely than women to increase their consumption of content in Ukrainian.

The younger and middle-aged groups more actively switched to Ukrainian-language content. For respondents over 65, this shift was more challenging, with significantly fewer in this age group having drastically changed the language of their content.

Slightly less than half (41%) of book readers reported reading more books by Ukrainian authors over the past year. The younger generations, aged 18-29 and 30-39, have been reading more books by Ukrainian authors compared to other age groups. Among the youth, there are more who have always read in Ukrainian. Conversely, among the older

generations, aged 60-75, we observe the opposite situation – there are significantly more people in this age group who have never read in Ukrainian and find it difficult to switch.

The second stage of the study involved focus group discussions. The methodology for conducting these discussions included dividing respondents into four clusters and conducting three focus group discussions for each cluster. The main criteria for dividing into clusters were factors such as proximity to the front line, immersion in stressful events and the degree of trauma caused by these events. According to our hypothesis, these factors are decisive in forming leisure practices and engagement in cultural life. Therefore, the 12 focus group discussions were divided into four clusters.

The first cluster consists of residents of Ukraine who have not left the country or their regions, have not been in active combat zones and have not been under occupation (mainly Central and Western Ukraine).

The second cluster consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have left combat zones and are currently in regions that were not affected by occupation or combat zones (regions of Western Ukraine and Central Ukraine – approximately Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Vinnytsia, etc.).

The third cluster consists of respondents who are in affected areas and have not left Ukraine (approximately Eastern and Southern Ukraine, mainly Kharkiv, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and other places of active combat).

The fourth cluster consists of Ukrainian citizens who have gone abroad and returned to Ukraine (mainly residents of cities in the East, South, North, and Center).

This division into clusters proved effective: we were able to observe significant differences in leisure activities and attitudes towards cultural practices based on war-related trauma and proximity to conflict.

The first cluster consists of Ukrainian citizens who have not left the country or their regions, have not been in active combat zones, and have not been under occupation (mainly Central and Western Ukraine). Participants in these focus groups are likely the most moderate and largely accustomed to the war situation. They have managed to adapt to the circumstances and live almost as they did before. This does not mean that these respondents watch less news or do not take cover during air-raid alerts. Rather, they make every effort to participate in as many cultural practices as possible. Therefore, this group of respondents is more aware of the current issues and prospects of domestic culture than others. In this sense, they continue to live as culturally rich a life as possible, perceiving cultural practices as a tool for relaxation, a mechanism for self-development, and a personal initiative in opposing the enemy by strengthening the cultural front. They position cultural engagement and development as a societal response to the aggressor. For this reason, complete distancing from Russian culture is essential for them. The need for a complete break from the Russian cultural area is undisputed. Most respondents did not need to distance themselves from Russian content because they were never particularly close to it. Their cultural practices and leisure activities have undergone the least change. As before, they still read a lot and enjoy attending artistic events. They perceive culture as the foundation, a unifying force, and the most critical aspect in need of protection. This is no longer a weak culture but a strong, independent, and original one fighting for its independence. That is why these people do not just believe in and hope for Victory; they know it will happen!

The second cluster consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have left combat zones and are currently in regions that were not affected by occupation or combat zones (regions of Western Ukraine and Central Ukraine – approximately Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Vinnytsia, etc.). This group of respondents is often quite traumatised by both the relocation and loss of property and home, as well as the process of adapting to a new location. Therefore, they often remain in shock for an extended period due to past happenings. These states of apathy, depression, anxiety disorders and panic attacks often affect their behavior, which in turn influences their leisure choices. As a result, these individuals, like those who continue to live in combat zones, prefer reading the news and find solace in books. They choose fantasy genres to quickly refocus their attention away from stressful news streams. For them, the most desirable form of relaxation is spending time in nature, taking walks in peace and quiet.

At the same time, moving to the regions of Western and Central Ukraine has opened new opportunities for these people: it has not only forced them to adapt to a somewhat new cultural environment but also brought them closer to the previously unfamiliar Ukrainian culture. Many internally displaced persons from Eastern Ukraine have been able to take advantage of cultural programs for displaced persons, which included free visits to theaters, museums, exhibitions and cinemas. This did not leave them indifferent but actually facilitated both their integration into the new cultural environment and societal cohesion, consolidating efforts in the fight against the enemy. For many displaced persons, such immersion in the culture of another region became a path to rethinking and reevaluating Ukrainian culture as a whole, offering a different perspective on its challenges and prospects, and most importantly, accelerating their own transition to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian content. Although for some respondents in the second cluster, Ukrainian culture is still perceived more through external attributes and general symbols than through shared values, it has become significantly closer and more personal.

People who fled from eastern to western Ukraine have mostly witnessed the real horrors of war firsthand. Even after being in complete safety, this experience continues to traumatize them, which has inevitably affected their perception of cultural consumption and their leisure activities. For some, the hospitality of the residents of western and central Ukraine, along with their unique culture and way of life, came as a surprise. For some displaced persons from the East, this experience broke the stereotype imposed by Russian propaganda about the inhabitants of western regions. Systematic cultural events organized for internally displaced persons in other regions have also become a means of psychological rehabilitation and adaptation for refugees, aiding their assimilation into a new cultural environment. Let's take a closer look at this group of respondents.

The third cluster — respondents who remain in the affected areas and have not left Ukraine (mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, and other areas of active combat). They are the most traumatized group of all respondents, and what's worse, they continue to be so, with no prospect of full psychological rehabilitation in the near future. The unfortunate reality is that they have become accustomed to the war. This not only means reduced fear and adaptation but also apathy and indifference: on one hand, a defensive reaction of the psyche, and on the other, a lowered sensitivity to the surrounding environment and

potential threats. Displaced people in western and central Ukraine find solace in the opportunity to participate in any cultural or artistic events in the region where they are staying, should they wish to do so. Residents of frontline zones often do not have such an opportunity due to their proximity to the "red zone" or being near it. The only leisure activities available to the residents of these areas are reading books and watching television. However, well-known musical bands and star performers often come to the combat zones to support the military and local residents in the frontline areas. Despite this, most respondents have spent the last year and a half primarily immersed in the news. Nature provides some brief moments of relaxation, but attending artistic and cultural events has understandably become a lower priority. For this reason, this group of respondents is the least informed about both new developments and the issues and prospects of Ukrainian culture. Ukrainian culture itself is perceived not so much through external symbols (and often without them) but through shared values that unite a diverse, multilingual community in resisting a common enemy. The understanding that the path to absolute Victory is possible only by completely severing ties with the Russian cultural sphere is present at the level of collective consciousness. All respondents claimed to understand this, and although gradually, they are confidently doing everything possible to radically change their language of communication and engage with Ukrainian content. Respondents emphasized this repeatedly. It was evidently important for them, despite speaking Russian or a mix of languages, to declare their position. The process of transitioning to the Ukrainian language is further complicated by the fact that even before the war, there were insufficient Ukrainian-language books available in the East. Importantly, at the level of collective consciousness, the overwhelming majority already understand that transitioning to the Ukrainian language and engaging with Ukrainian culture, amid the total break with the "Russian world" is not a fad or a matter of fashion, but a mechanism of self-defense and self-preservation for the nation. That is why there is an unprecedentedly strong and vibrant interest in Ukrainian culture, books, cinema, and music right now. For they represent the future.

The fourth cluster consists of Ukrainian citizens who have gone abroad and returned to Ukraine (mainly residents of cities in the East, South, North, and Center). This is the most optimistic group of respondents regarding the prospects of Ukrainian culture. A significant role was played by their experience of comparing Ukrainian and European cultures, medicine, services and mentalities. None of the respondents expressed regret about returning to Ukraine, despite the war. However, most returned to the Western and Central regions of Ukraine, with fewer returning to the East. Among those who returned, none had lost their homes. The main reasons for returning included difficulties with self-realization and children's education, lack of work and suitable housing (not everyone was willing to live in refugee camps when they had more comfortable living conditions in Ukraine). Respondents in this group, unlike others, had significantly more free time to engage in various leisure activities. Some managed to visit several museums in Europe, which had long invited Ukrainians for free. Respondents from this group watched films and read books more often than others. However, this cluster faced the issue of a limited range of Ukrainian-language content for refugees in EU camps, along with an abundance of Russian-language literature and an underdeveloped market for Ukrainian-language audio and e-books. Given that most respondents tried to watch all video content translated

into Ukrainian, such translations were critically lacking. Respondents from this group, like those from the first cluster (those who did not leave the Center and West), closely observe and highly appreciate the rapid development of Ukrainian culture. They are familiar with the names of new star performers, bands and new projects. They are also among those who most eagerly listen to podcasts about Ukrainian history and culture. Their cultural practices have transformed both with leaving Ukraine and returning; they are striving to switch to the Ukrainian language, realizing that Victory on the cultural front is possible only with a complete rejection of the aggressor's language. Unfortunately, in the camps, according to most respondents in the fourth group, this understanding is not prevailing. Although most refugees who left the East mostly understand and support the idea of switching to Ukrainian, some still find it difficult. Unfortunately, some abandon these attempts upon finding themselves in a Russian-speaking environment in the camp. Despite this, Russian-speaking parents often start teaching their children Ukrainian, realizing its prospects. Those who return, having not found themselves in Europe, understand this first and foremost. Therefore, there were many discussions about the need to develop Ukrainian-language content, which unfortunately still lags behind the enemy's in scale. For this group, Ukrainian culture is something that should revive Ukraine and bring Victory closer. Often in their imagination, Ukrainian culture appears in the symbolic image of a military woman, wounded, but nevertheless freedom-loving, courageous and indomitable in her desire to reclaim and protect her own. If we reflect on the fact that our telephone survey of Ukrainians resulted in a typology of leisure behavior divided into types: Traditionalists, Socialites, Readers, and Inactives, we might assume that the third cluster has the most Inactives. There might be slightly fewer among IDPs (the second cluster), but there are already quite a few Readers and Traditionalists. However, in the first and fourth clusters, there are likely fewer Inactives, with more Socialites present.

In conclusion, it should be added that all the aforementioned groups are united by a belief in Victory, sincere attention to Ukrainian culture and a desire to distance themselves from the Russian language and content. The process of distancing from everything Russian continues at different speeds in different clusters but importantly shares a common, irreversible goal. It is significant that, at the level of collective consciousness, the prevailing majority already understands that transitioning to the Ukrainian language and engaging with Ukrainian culture, amidst a total break from the "Russian world" is not a whim or a fashion trend, but a mechanism for national self-defense and preservation. Therefore, interest in Ukrainian culture, books, cinema and music is unprecedentedly alive and high, as they represent the future.

The key areas of cultural development that will require close attention after Victory will include:

1. Restoration of the destroyed cultural infrastructure in the occupied territories and former combat zones, as well as the creation of a database and a full record of the damage and losses incurred.
2. Systematic and complete distancing from Russian culture and content at the level of all cultural institutions, which will require political will and legislative changes.
3. Increased focus on the organization of cultural institutions in reintegrated territories, which will need special support for the development of cultural industries.

4. Development of a comprehensive State Strategy for the development of Ukrainian culture, ensuring the interconnected growth of all cultural sectors aligned with a unified national goal and identity.
5. Enhanced, targeted, and systematic funding for the cultural sector, including the creation of subsidies for state cultural institutions, microgrants for the development of cultural industries, and scholarships for young artists.
6. Restoration of festivals and competitions aimed at rebuilding the human resource potential of cultural institutions and promoting the active development of culture overall.
7. Development of foreign representations and centers of Ukrainian culture, along with systematic work with the diaspora to spread and promote Ukrainian culture internationally.
8. Rebuilding the human resource and staffing capacity of cultural institutions to ensure their full operation.
9. Systematic support for cultural connections with Ukrainian refugees abroad, including the creation of library collections and video libraries at refugee camps and centers.

The third stage of our research involved in-depth expert interviews.

Summarizing our discussions with the experts, the following should be noted: at times, they expressed diametrically opposite positions when discussing the same issues. However, they were united on key points. Ukrainian culture, which received a tremendous boost since the start of the full-scale invasion, now has the mission of being a weapon. Today, during the war, our culture is not only an object of protection but also protects itself, unites, and provides strength and inspiration. It is what holds us in determination, fills us with the energy to move forward, serving both as a goal and a means simultaneously.

3. Conclusions

Culture, as a factor of sustainable development, implies that we define culture in a broad sense: as an entire way of life. Social structure, national values and national consciousness are products of culture. Culture encompasses all other dimensions of sustainability and its transformation becomes a key issue or paradigm of sustainability. Conversely, its destruction or appropriation by another state is a factor that disrupts stability and poses a threat to the sustainability and security of society. In this context, the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), adopted on May 28, 2024, became important for Ukraine. It recognized that Russia is committing cultural genocide in Ukrainian territories. The erasure of Ukrainian cultural identity is a tool of war against Ukraine and is aimed at destroying the Ukrainian nation. The PACE Committee on Culture unanimously supported the resolution "Countering the Destruction of Cultural Identity During War and Peace" (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized that Russia is committing cultural genocide in Ukrainian territories, August 10, 2024). The resolution establishes that Russia uses cultural "cleansing" as a tool of war to destroy Ukrainian identity and erase history, values, literature, music, traditions and language. Such actions constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity and

demonstrate a specific genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation or at least part of it, particularly through the destruction of Ukrainian identity and culture. This is part of a genocide campaign that Russia is conducting against the Ukrainian people. The use of a broad approach by the Ukrainian side to the concept of genocide, including the destruction of culture and identity, will contribute to proving Russia's intent to commit genocide against the Ukrainian people at an international legal level. Using the concept of cultural genocide to qualify Russia's actions in Ukraine also opens opportunities for raising issues of restitution of cultural values and compensation for the damage inflicted on Ukrainian culture and identity.

Cultural heritage occupies a central place in the strategy of Russian aggression against Ukraine regarding the establishment of historical, cultural and religious hegemony over Ukrainian regions. Denying Ukraine's right of ownership to its cultural heritage, its appropriation and destruction are hybrid means of coercion, dominance, and annexation by Russia. Protecting cultural heritage in the conditions of Russian aggression must be based on its significance for the Ukrainian people, particularly as a potential for post-war recovery and sustainable development of the Ukrainian state.

In the context of Russian aggression, which poses an existential threat to the Ukrainian people, state policy in the field of cultural heritage becomes an important factor in ensuring Ukraine's national security. Cultural heritage acquires key importance for creating a material and intangible cultural foundation for the unity of society, strengthening Ukrainian civic identity, further development of Ukraine as a united and democratic state, and cohesion of the Ukrainian people (Potapenko V., Tishchenko Yu. & Kaplan Yu., et al, 2023). If a national culture does not produce shared values, symbols, and meanings for the nation, that nation will gradually assimilate or fragment into disparate, and potentially hostile, social groups. To overcome this fragmentation, it is necessary to establish a unified and cohesive humanitarian space, which will ensure the value-based and ideological unity of the Ukrainian people and create the proper preconditions for the formation of a Ukrainian political nation. The key conditions for creating this unified humanitarian space include the development of:

- Shared symbolic systems (language, religion, value systems, historical and cultural heritage);
- National cultural industries;
- A domestic education system;
- National media that will promote national cultural products and historical-cultural heritage, and ensure the unity of the communicative space.

Therefore, to ensure the integrity of the humanitarian space, there must be real integration of sectoral, regional, and local public spheres into a unified system based on achieving structural completeness in national culture. In order to implement the strategic priorities of state policy in the cultural sector, achieve national unity, and consolidate the Ukrainian political nation by overcoming both objective and artificial contradictions of a sociocultural, confessional, ethnic, linguistic, interregional, and regional nature, while fully adhering to the constitutional guarantees of human and citizen rights and freedoms, a number of key tasks must be addressed. To achieve this, it is essential to spread among various social, age, educational, and cultural groups of the Ukrainian people the idea of

shared historical destiny, the advantages of close cooperation and mutual assistance, and the direct dependence of the success of each Ukrainian citizen on the level of unity in Ukrainian society. This will contribute to the formation of a national idea in its broad, worldview sense.

To overcome threats in the cultural sphere and to stimulate the development of cultural industries at the national level, a series of measures must be implemented, including:

1. Ensuring the continued protection of Ukraine's information space and supporting the publishing industry.
2. Abolishing profit tax and introducing a zero VAT rate across the entire "chain" of domestic paper production, publication preparation, printing, and book sales. This decision is justified when compared to the gambling industry, with a turnover of up to \$10 billion, paying only 2% of revenue.
3. Implementing the Reading Development Strategy until 2032.
4. Including, as a mandatory part of Ukraine's post-war recovery plan, financed by the EU, guaranteed funding for the program to replenish library collections and support bookstores.
5. Continuing the e-Support program immediately after Victory, which will help quickly revive the book sector.

It is also necessary to:

- Develop a unified State Strategy for the development of domestic cultural industries and ensure the implementation of a consistent state policy to address issues related to the organization of the film industry and publishing sector.
- Improve existing legislation in the field of culture, clearly defining ways to optimize financial support for the sector using non-governmental funding sources.
- Create mechanisms for tax exemptions for funds invested from other sectors into the development of cultural industries. Address the issue of taxation on patronage and sponsorship funds directed towards this sector.
- The National Bank of Ukraine should develop preferential lending mechanisms through state and commercial banks for film industry and publishing enterprises.
- Ensure the creation of a wide national network of cinemas and book distribution focused on promoting domestic products, particularly achieving the following cinema facilities distribution: for urban populations — two cinema halls per 100,000 inhabitants, and for rural populations — four cinema-video units per 10,000 inhabitants. Additionally, in the film industry, continue reforming the material and technical base of cinematography, particularly:
 - Facilitate the creation of a modern technical base at the Oleksandr Dovzhenko National Center for subtitling, processing, and distributing films, converting them to digital formats, and establishing studios for sound and film dubbing using Dolby systems.
 - Organize cinema networks in district centers and small towns (with populations of 10,000 to 50,000) for the screening of films on digital media by reconstructing cinemas and implementing multimedia technology. In the publishing industry:

- Designate Ukraine's publishing industry as a national strategic priority.
- Ensure the implementation of a unified state policy to address issues related to the organization of the publishing sector.
- Develop mechanisms to improve interaction and coordination between state authorities, local governments, and publishers to promote the development of domestic books.

Our research shows how important it is in the current conditions for Ukraine to invest in supporting cultural institutions with effort, time and finances. Now, more than ever, state support for culture is timely and a nationwide cultural development strategy is becoming a pressing need. All this is necessary because only distancing from Russian culture, independence from it and self-sufficiency are chances for Ukraine to maintain its subjectivity as a state and preserve national identity. Further stable development of national culture and the formation of a resilient national identity will safeguard the country from territorial encroachment in the future and help reclaim occupied territories. Most importantly, it will facilitate the cultural reintegration of the population of these territories, returning them to Ukraine's national cultural space.

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